Read part 2 of this series, IRAN'S STATE INSTITUTIONS UNDER ISLAMIC SOCIALISM

Internal and External Threats to the Islamic Republic

Obviously, the threat of a direct military confrontation with Zionism is dominating the headlines, as is ISIS terrorism (the heinous attacks on the memorials for General Soleimani that killed over 100 people this January comes to mind). But the biggest vulnerability of the Islamic Republic are the class contradictions arising from within Iran itself. Without resolving these contradictions, Iran cannot continue to be the effective leader of the Resistance Axis and the player in the emerging multi polar world it aspires to be.

                                                             Class divisions in Iran

Class Contradictions and Political Divisions

In certain ways, the Islamic Revolution is burdened by one of its greatest successes: the expansion of its middle classes. In 1979 only 5% of Iran’s population was middle class, now over 34% is. This was not a mere accident, but a result of government policy. In the wake of the Iran Iraq war, the government provided university scholarships for millions of family members of veterans of the conflict; in effect, Iran’s version of the GI Bill. This gave many working class men and women access to a university education for the first time, and allowed them to enter the middle class. In a twist of irony, this very class created by the Islamic Revolutionaries has largely come to turn against the Islamic socialist system.

Liberals and even many Marxists ignore the class dimension of these clashes in Iranian society. This class conflict is best represented and explained by the two main parties in Iranian politics. There are the Reformists (as represented by President Khatami who was in office from 1997-2005) and President Rouhani (served 2013-2021), and the Principalists (represented by President Ahmadinejad when he served 2005-2013), and Raisi (who served 2021 until his death in 2024). The Iranian middle class tends to vote for the Reformers, the working class tends to vote for the Principalists. There are of course exceptions, but these are the general trends.

Reformist Presidents Muhammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani

The Iranian middle class tends to desire more personal freedoms and resents the conservative religious laws enforced by the clergy. As aspiring entrepreneurs, they feel stifled by the large public sector, and demand privatization of the state run enterprises/the bonyads. Many are also unenthusiastic about Iran’s commitment to the Palestinians and other anti imperialist causes, feeling that these constitute an unnecessary drain on Iran’s resources.

By contrast the working class/rural poor majority, roughly 2/3rds of the population, feels differently. They support maintaining the state sector (since they materially benefit from it), and since they are extremely religious, tend to view cultural liberalization as creeping Western influence.

The two camps have come into increasing conflict with each other. The West funds, encourages, and carries out information warfare in support of the Reformist camp, since they see them as more likely to destabilize and bring down the Islamic Republic.

In 2009, President Ahmadinejad won re-election, and the Reformers cried fraud, mobilizing a largely upper middle class movement known as the Green Movement. Working class Principalists supporters, Basij activists, and police fought against them in the streets and dozens were killed, and thousands arrested. Western and Iranian exile media gave overwhelmingly positive coverage to the Green Movement.

                                                    Mahsa Amini, icon of the 2022 protests

The same playbook unfolded in 2021-2022. In 2021, another Principalist, Raisi, won Iran’s national elections. The next year, the same middle class forces that supported the Green Movement seized upon the death of Mahsa Amini to kick start mass protests against the government- protests which became violent. Hundreds were killed by the police and security forces as well as by the protesters themselves(the exact numbers of those killed and the circumstances of their deaths is hotly disputed). There was also an ISIS terrorist attack on a Shia shrine at the same time as the protests, further contributing to the destabilization.

Future Prospects and Potential Resolutions

How can these contradictions in Iranian society be resolved? The harsh US sanctions on Iran give encouragement to the Reformist/middle class tendencies, who believe that if Iran relaxes its anti Western posture, drops its anti neoliberal and anti imperialist policies (especially its support for Palestine), the sanctions will be lifted and the new prosperity from trade with the West will boost the middle class.

This was the logic of President Rouhani's nuclear deal with the Obama administration in 2015. While it did initially succeed in increasing Iran’s trade with Europe, the Trump administration pulling out of the deal and assassinating General Soleimani in 2020 proved the Principalist arguments against the agreement correct, and badly damaged the credibility of the Reformist camp.

By contrast, the late President Raisi’s strategy has been to turn to the rising Chinese/Russian economic bloc for economic support instead, working around the US sanctions and not compromising on the Islamic Republic's anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist principles. It seems likely that with time, prosperity coming from trade via the Belt and Road will help create a different middle class, one that has access to the consumer goods and opportunities it desires, but one that is also loyal to the Islamic Revolution and turns to the East instead of the West for inspiration.

                                         President Ebrahim Raisi meeting with Xi Jinping

Therefore, the notion that the Iranian system is a house of cards in imminent danger of collapse is in error. Given the deep well of support and legitimacy the system has with the majority of the population, a rapid collapse is unlikely barring a nuclear conflict or some equivalent catastrophe. Hopefully, the turn towards the BRICS and multipolarity will be continued by whoever Raisi’s successor is in a prudent fashion to resolve Iran’s external and internal contradictions. Iran’s upcoming Presidential elections on June 28 will provide more clarity on the path forward, but a continuation of the path the late Raisi took is likely, due to the factors outlined in this essay.