The path of the opposition has escalated to new levels of complexity after the primaries were held. This is because the predicted victory of María "Con Ira" Machado subjects them to tensions and temptations that will define the state in which they would reach the second half of 2024, the agreed period in Barbados for the presidential elections.

Tensions, Leadership, and Violence

The first tension lies in the role that the leader of Vente Venezuela will play from now on within the opposition archipelago. During the campaign, she expressed her decision to assume a single leadership, although it is not clear if it is a unitary one.

In this sense, a few hours before the primaries, the media has titled in accordance with said story, while other parties and candidates recognized her victory. However, other sectors of anti-Chavismo have been cautious in distinguishing between her role as a candidate and her coronation claims.

On the day of the primary, Omar Barboza, executive secretary of the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD), said that "a candidate is chosen, and it is up to the opposition to choose the leadership." The general secretary of a sector of Democratic Action, Henry Ramos Allup, declared something similar at a press conference last Monday, October 23: "We chose a candidate, not a leader. There are many leaders in the opposition."

Since April 2022, Machado has demanded the leadership of the team of which she is a part and has been clear in stating that she would take over once she won the event that took place last Sunday.

The second tension has to do with an aspect that is no less important: Machado is disqualified from registering her candidacy with the National Electoral Council (CNE) for presidential, regional, or legislative elections. She cannot hold public office because the disqualification is administrative, not political, in nature. This condition would remain until beyond 2024; before this, a kind of déjà vu appears on the horizon.

As is known, she has been a promoter of different unconstitutional strategies for regime change in Venezuela, from coups d'état such as that of April 11, 2002, or the attempt of April 30, 2019; going through the flat signatures in 2004 during her stay in the NGO SUMATE, to violent escalations and terrorism such as "La Salida" in 2014 and 2017 and the request for a foreign military invasion.

She has projected that she will "defeat the disqualification" and that she will register as a candidate in 2024. This is where the point of tension is, because it is a scenario that would be achieved by violating the independence of public powers, something that the Executive Branch has posed as impossible.

The opposition intelligentsia has already proposed the scenario of returning to the format of violence (guarimbas) as a method of political pressure. During his speech at a forum at, an unfortunate fascist lair, the Andrés Bello Catholic University (UCAB), the director of the NGO Venezuelan Observatory of Violence, Roberto Briceño León, highlighted the latent possibility of the emergence of scenarios of social conflict and protests by the population against the purpose of the incidence of the primaries.

This was stated based on a survey by the Delphos pollster that showed the willingness of 41% of those consulted to protest in a "non-violent" way against the Bolivarian Government, while 50.8% would not have conceived of it.

The question remains regarding the sponsorship of the United States government, which, through agencies such as USAID, IRI, NDI, and NED, has financed these initiatives while sabotaging the national political dialogue.

Another question has to do precisely with the recent agreements signed in Barbados between the government and the PUD, which assume the electoral option as a space for resolving the political conflict. It is unknown if, she called for violence, Machado would achieve the support of the rest of the opposition parties and, if she failed in her objective, scenarios of discredit and discontent on the part of her electorate would be repeated.

Machado, a self-proclaimed liberal — tied to Netanyahu's Zionist Party and the Whole Zionist lobby, Bush, Trump, and to all Far Right parties, foundations, NGOs, think tanks, and media platforms — has declared that these agreements "lack certainty" while the PUD affirms that this is just the beginning of a long process, which is why they aspire to enable their candidate.

Temptation, Division, and Failure

The opposition faces the temptation to return to the path of belligerent confrontation, as has been mentioned, but also to present itself before a presidential electoral event in a divided manner, as is usual. In this, María Corina Machado's vanity, anti-politics, and shortcuts play a fundamental role.

Her tendency to distance herself from the rest of the opposition sector when she fails is historic; this has reduced the stability of her relationship with the other parties, which was demonstrated in the campaign towards the primaries - by not joining the PUD - and has become evident before. Her insistence on taking paths outside the Constitution, such as "pressure and breaking"—"until the end," could create false expectations in her electorate, but also obstacles in the formation of her campaign.

More so when precisely this stubbornness has been the reason for her disqualification and the continued failure of the opposition.

Added to this is the temptation to designate a candidate inside or outside the primaries to "inherit" her disqualified candidacy, by assuming herself as the sole leader to whom the others must join, and not the other way around.

Even though she is as responsible as other leaders for the 20 years of electoral failures, she is still tempted to establish herself as the "new" leadership and has capitalized on the rejection of the G3+1. This could lead her to fail to comply with what was signed by the PUD in Barbados and to underestimate other sectors of that opposition, whom her entourage calls "complicit opposition."

As is usual in the anti-Chavista leadership, the initiative is Washington's prerogative. The challenges of the oppositions do not come from their organizational capacity, programs, speeches, or the electoral offer of their parties. It is others, outside Venezuelan borders, who do the work and determine both the agreements and the decisions.