Reviewing ‘Which Path to Persia?’ by The Brookings Institution, a Washington D.C. Political Think Tank.

Cover art by PUNlSHEDJesus.

In June 2009, The Brookings Institution, a Washington, D.C.-based American think tank, published an analysis paper called ‘Which Path to Persia?’ to analyse and create a coherent strategy for how the United States could take down the Iranian state [1]. The paper identified Iran as an opponent of the United States government and its interests due to Iran’s support for anti-American groups, subversion of American-aligned governments, support for the Palestinian cause and most importantly, its pursuit of nuclear technology. It proposed nine policy options, categorised under diplomatic, military, regime change and containment, that could be used either as stand-alone policies or in combination to end the US’s worries regarding these issues. It is believed that US administrations use this paper as a handbook for their Iran policy. This investigation will provide a summary of the options, analyse them and examine their development in the 15 years since the paper was written.

Option 1: Persuasion

Representatives from Iran, China, France, Germany, the EU, Russia, Britain and the USA announcing the completion of the JCPoA Agreement [2].

This option can be described as “carrot and stick”. It involves using positive inducements as a carrot and the threat of economic and diplomatic sanctions as a stick. The goal would be to change Iran’s behaviour rather than changing the government. It involves a multi-year process wherein Iran gives up its nuclear program, support for regional allies, military technology and anti-Zionism in exchange for integration into the American-led world economy, security guarantees and a role in an American-led order in West Asia. If Iran were to not comply, the US would implement very harsh sanctions targetting Iran diplomatically and economically, especially to deny Iran’s right to sell its oil and gas. This would however require the cooperation of other important global players.

This policy was attempted under the Obama admin with the ‘JCPoA’ or ‘Iran Nuclear Deal’. After a pro-Western Iranian administration came into power in the 2013 Presidential election, negotiations began on a deal wherein Iran would give up its nuclear capabilities in exchange for the lifting of sanctions [3]. This was to be the first deal in a series of deals that would later target Iran’s support for regional allies and its missile and drone programs [4]. The head of the US negotiating team, John Kerry, later admitted this in an interview with MSNBC host Lawrence O’Donnell in 2020, when he said that the US increased non-nuclear sanctions on Iran after the deal to pressure Iran to sign further agreements [64]. A Iranian Presidential advisor from that time later stated in an interview in 2023 that the final step of the normalisation program under the JCPoA framework would be normalisation with Israel, stating that this must be pursued if Iran were seek the benefits of positive relations with the United States [5].

The nuclear deal was signed in 2015, although sanctions were never truly lifted, even though Iran complied with its terms [6]. In addition to this, the US applied even more non-nuclear sanctions on Iran as mentioned above [64]. In 2018, US President Trump left the deal, beginning a period of “maximum pressure” against Iran that closed all diplomatic avenues [7, 8]. Since 2020, with the rise of anti-Western parliaments and the Raisi administration in Iran, nuclear enrichment has been expanded and it has recently been revealed by Iranian and Western sources that Iran can now produce a nuclear bomb in under a week, rendering continued negotiations useless [9, 10].

However, things have taken a radical change ever since the unexpected passing of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in May 2024 and the Iranian snap Presidential election. The victor of the elections, Masoud Pezeshkian, ran his campaign primarily on the promise of re-entering and expanding the JCPoA agreements, applying the principles of the G7 anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism organisation known as the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) inside Iran, and normalising relations with the West [11, 12]. His campaign staff and backers also included a long list of supporters of the JCPoA agreement and notably, the ardently pro-JCPoA former Foreign Minister who negotiated the 2015, Mohammad-Javad Zarif, was one of the main faces of his campaign [13, 14, 15]. There are also indications that pro-Western diplomats will take over the leadership of the foreign ministry in the new government [16]. All of this indicates a strong desire among the new Iranian government that will take office in August to re-open the Persuasion option as a pathway for the US.

Iranian President-elect Pezeshkian with former Foreign Minister Zarif during their 2024 Presidential election campaign [17].

However, the United States has made no indication that it will re-enter the JCPoA. When a spokesperson for the White House was asked about Pezeshkian’s election, he stated that Iran would have to make far more concessions to reach a new deal with the US [18]. Given the adamance to normalise with the West and get sanctions lifted that Pezeshkian and the Reformist-Moderate political movement to which he belongs have shown, it would not be surprising if they provide further concessions beyond nuclear arrangements to reach their desired deal. However, other elements within the Iranian state and the Iranian Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei may attempt to block this from happening. Also, it is unknown whether a new administration in the US, possibly headed by former President Donald Trump, may be willing to re-enter negotiations. Therefore, the future of the JCPoA and the Persuasion option is as of yet unclear. This option may yet again turn into the primary option to be used against Iran, however, it may fail to be activated.

Option 2: Engagement

The Shah of Iran with US President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara back when Iran and the USA were allies in the Cold War [19].

This option is largely the same as the Persuasion option, however, it only offers a carrot and no stick. The logic is that negative incentives would galvanise Iran’s anti-Western political forces, therefore only positive ones should be used. The goal of the option would be to get Iranians out of their anti-American stance by showing them that the US is not their enemy. This would strengthen pro-Western factions in Iran and eventually lead to a change in the behaviour of the Islamic Republic. This option was never implemented in reality since many believed that there was no guarantee that Iran would do what was expected if it was implemented.

Option 3: Invasion

US Army soldiers standing in formation before being deployed to the Middle East [20].

This option is self-explanatory. The goal would be to destroy the Iranian government and its military capability and set up a US-backed state in Tehran, just as was done in Iraq and Afghanistan. The option requires many things. Firstly, to satisfy the American people and the international community, a large provocation would be required, like 9/11. The chances of such an event were deemed unlikely, however, the US could use a false flag and blame it on Iran. Also, diplomatically, except for Israel, no country in the region would be willing to openly support an invasion and the invasion would likely further damage America's global image.

Military, invading Iran would be a daunting task because of Iran's geography, size and adeptness at asymmetric warfare. When the paper was written, it was assumed an initial invasion force of 200 to 250 thousand would be required. Marines would have to first seize a major port, where new facilities would have to be installed. Paratroopers would meanwhile have to seize important mountain passes, after which troops would move from the port to Tehran. All of this of course assumes that Iranians would put up no effective resistance and that the state and military would collapse with the fall of Tehran. After the presumed fall, the US would require 1.4 million troops to occupy Iran. It is suggested that this number could be halved with the use of training, technology and tactics, but partial conscription of US citizens would still be required. The paper assumes that these requirements and the large number of US soldiers that would likely be lost every month would cause significant discontent among the American people. Due to high costs and unpredictability, this option was never used.

Option 4: Airstrikes

American pilots boarding a B-52H Stratofortress bomber in preparation for a flight over the Middle East in 2021 [21].

This option involves striking Iran's nuclear facilities, as was done with Iraq's Osiraq reactor and Syria's Deir ez-Zur facility. The option could be expanded to include conventional military targets and command centres. The goal of this option would be "to obliterate much or all of Iran’s nuclear program". Primary targets were listed as reactors in Bushehr, Arak (defunct due to the JCPoA), Natanz, Esfahan, Parchin, Karaj and Tehran, as well as missile design, production, and testing facilities [22]. It was estimated that such an attack could delay Iran's capability to build a nuclear bomb by a decade or more. However, if it were less successful or if Iran had hidden sites unknown to the US, the delay could be as little as two years.

Airstrikes would also likely be unpopular with other countries, except Israel and, privately, some Arab states. Therefore, it was suggested that the option would work better if there is a perception that it is a response to an act of Iranian aggression. Due to Iran's capabilities, it is presumed that the US would also have to attack Iranian radar sites, missile batteries, Air Defence command and control centres and the most dangerous Iranian Airforce fighter squadrons. This would therefore require thousands of sorties to be made. This option has not been attempted and feasibility has decreased due to Iran's military advancements and increased deterrence. The Arak Plutonium Reactor was, however, shut down as a part of the JCPoA deal and sabotage of the nuclear program has occurred through other means [22, 23].

Option 5: Allowing or Encouraging an Israeli Military Strike

Israeli Air Force F-35s during a drill in 2023 [24].

This option would remove American pressure on Israel preventing Israeli airstrikes on Iran, and may even mean encouraging the Israeli state to conduct these strikes. Over the last few decades, Israel has repeatedly threatened to strike Iranian nuclear facilities and the goal of this option would be for the US to use Israel's animosity towards Iran to destroy or limit Iran's nuclear capabilities [25]. The paper states that for such strikes, in-air refuelling would be required for Israeli jets, and although they can do considerable damage to any sites, they would likely not be able to do as much damage as a direct US strike would be able to. Nonetheless, the US cannot escape blame for such an attack as the jets that Israel would use would be American and they would have to pass through the territory of American-aligned states. Also, Iranian retaliation against Israeli and American targets would be likely.

As of July 2024, this option has effectively been neutralised. Iran's drone and missile attack on April 14th in retaliation to Israel's strike on Iran's consulate in Damascus has changed the balance of power between the two states [26]. Iran has effectively proven that it can directly strike Israel and that Israel would be left helpless in the face of an Iranian drone and missile offensive without the aid of its Western and regional allies. Israel's embarrassing response (or lack thereof) to the attack proves that they no longer have the deterrence capabilities necessary to dissuade Iran from retaliation against them if they conducted such a strike and would be reliant on American aid to conduct a response [27]. Due to the United States’ unwillingness to engage in a conventional war with Iran, both for reasons mentioned previously in this thread and due to their increased commitments in Eastern Europe and East Asia, Israeli strikes on Iran are now too risky for both the US and Israel [28].

Option 6: Conducting a Colour Revolution

Tehran protests in October 2022 during the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ Movement [29].

This option involves creating and supporting an uprising in Iran by opponents of the Islamic Republic, similar to what was done in Eastern European countries in the 1980s and in Arab countries like Syria and Libya in the "Arab Spring”. The explicitly stated aim of this option is to replace the Iranian state with one "whose views would be more compatible with US interests in the region". The hope would be that the new regime would no longer be a regional actor or aim for the development of its military. Supporting opposition groups also acts as a form of pressure on the Iranian state, which would give the United States more leverage on other issues. The paper explicitly states that support for these groups could be dropped if the US's interests are otherwise realised. This policy seeks to use pro-American Liberal groups inside Iran such as the Reformists and Liberal social classes. These groups would be promoted in the hopes of creating "glasnost" and "perestroika" style campaigns that weaken the foundations of the Iranian state. The US would also have to provide a means of communication, weaponry, media support, economic pressure and military threats to help “revolutionaries" who would aim to overthrow the state.

Various possible proxies were listed that could be used to conduct the operations and lead the colour revolution. The first proxy listed is the Reformists. The paper states that they are the most powerful option with the most support inside Iran. However, it also states that they are often weak and divided politically and many of them would be satisfied with only a reformed version of the Islamic Republic. The second group is "intellectuals" including academics, Reformist journalists and dissident clerics. This group's strength lies in its reputation and credentials, however, it lacks the political capital to be effective.

Also, dissident clerics tend to be apolitical. The next group, listed as "Student, Labor, and Civil Society Organisations" also has the same issues from the US's point of view. Workers are seen as more or less loyal to the state and students and civil organisations are powerless, with their movements having short life spans. The last proxy suggestion is Reza Pahlavi, the disgraced former Crown Prince of the ousted Pahlavi dynasty. This option is quickly disregarded since "although some Iranians appear to evince some nostalgia for the monarchy, there is no serious monarchist movement in Iran”.

The paper states that tens of millions of dollars a year would be required for such an operation, some of which would be wasted. It would also require excellent intelligence to identify and control leaders, which is difficult since the US has no embassy in Iran. Finally, the paper mentions the very high likelihood that if a regime change movement kicks off on the ground, the Iranian state will not give up without a fight and it could easily result in a civil war. It suggests, therefore, that the US be prepared to conduct a military intervention, similar to what occurred with the American-sponsored colour revolution in Syria.

This is the option that has come to be most relied upon by the US government and their main ally when it comes to opposing Iran: Israel. The paper itself was published at the height of the most major colour revolution attempt in Iranian history during the 2009 Green Movement protests, which saw millions of middle and upper-class Iranians take to the streets to protest what they believed had been a stolen presidential election [30]. This movement, however, was primarily reform-orientated. Nonetheless, it signified the beginning of an expanded regime change movement sponsored by the US and Israel that seeks to use any divisions or issues within Iranian society to weaken and ultimately overthrow the Iranian state. The latest and most well-funded iteration of this was the 2022 ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement. This movement has deeply radicalised sections of the Iranian population and the Iranian diaspora against the Iranian state. Further details about this movement, its funding, background and effects can be read in the groundbreaking RTSG report on the topic, linked below.

Option 7: Creating an Insurgency

Female militants of the PDKI anti-Iranian Kurdish separatist organization receiving training in Iraq [31].

This option is related to the previous one but takes it a step further. It calls for an attempt to directly try and create a civil war in Iran through the use of separatist terrorist organisations that claim to represent various ethnic groups in Iran, primarily Kurds, Baluchis and Arabs, alongside other groups that have a history of armed conflict with the Iranian state such as the terrorist organisation known as the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (MEK). The goal would be to alleviate the US’s issues with Iran by either causing a successful regime change or by placing Tehran under so much pressure that it can no longer oppose American designs for the region or develop its military and nuclear capabilities. Hence, Iran would be forced to make major concessions to the United States. The paper states that although insurgencies can generally take many years to succeed and in Iran’s case, it would likely take decades due to the Islamic Republic’s devoted supporters, it can nonetheless bear fruit by placing enough pressure on Iran for it to abide by American dictates. If the goal remains a complete regime change, then it is suggested that the US aid the insurgency by direct military intervention to speed up its progress.

The policy would require that the United States provide arms, money, training, and organisational assistance to help the groups develop and extend their reach while using its media capabilities to bolster the groups’ message and develop the image of their leaders. The paper states that “the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) could take care of most of the supplies and training for these groups, as it has for decades all over the world.” Direct military assistance on behalf of Washington, however, would be contemplated if it was desired that the insurgency advance at a faster pace, if the insurgency was faced with a decisive defeat or to protect neighbouring states harbouring the insurgents from attacks by Iran. However, it can be presumed that US administrations would be unlikely to provide such direct support, especially today, when they are faced with more challenges to US hegemonic rule in East Asia and Eastern Europe.

In addition to providing a significant amount of money, weaponry and other resources, the United States would also have to find willing and able insurgent groups to act as its proxies. The paper suggests primarily that Kurdish, Baluchi and Arab separatist organisations could be used due to their successful attempts at conducting terror attacks in the past. The peripheral geographic position of these ethnic minority groups and the rugged terrain in the cases of the Baluchis and Kurds would help them in this task. Also, the tribal structure of these ethnic groups and their societies mean that alternative power structures to the Iranian state already exist among the groups, which could be readily exploited by the insurgents and their sponsor, the US. 

However, the ethnic separatists face several issues as well. Firstly, except for the Kurdish groups, they do not represent a sizeable entity, and none of these groups, including the Kurdish one, have the ability to mobilise beyond their communities. Secondly, these groups do not have strong ties with one another and in the Kurdish case, they even have serious divisions among themselves. Lastly, a separatist insurgency would undoubtedly inspire strong patriotic sentiments among the general mass of the Iranian population, even among the ethnic minorities, who would oppose an attempt to balkanise Iran.

As a broad national insurgency group not tied to ethnicity, the paper suggests the People’s Mojahedin Organisation, commonly known by the acronyms MeK or MKO. Again, the paper mentions the group’s successful terror attacks and sabotage operations throughout the years to make the case for why they would be a good option. It states that followers are strongly devoted to opposing the Islamic Republic, however, it accurately notes that the group is generally loathed among the Iranian people, both due to its terror attacks and due to their role in fighting against Iran on behalf of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Ba’athist Party during the Iran-Iraq War. The Iranian state is also noted as having a strong sensitivity towards the group meaning that it would be very difficult for them to organise any insurgency inside Iran.

Members of the People’s Mojahedin Organisation during a speech by former Vice President Mike Pence in 2022 [32].

Lastly, for the insurgency option to be implemented, a conduit and safe haven nation would be required for the groups to train, plan, organize, heal, and resupply. This role, for instance, was played by Pakistan during the US-backed Afghan mujahideen insurgency against Afghanistan’s Soviet-aligned government in the 1980s. Pakistan could again play this role for Baluchi insurgents, however they would most likely demand American concessions and aid in return for their role as a conduit. The Kurdish case is however more difficult since Turkey and Iraq would be unwilling to provide a haven for Kurdish separatists since they also fear Kurdish separatism within their Kurdish-populated regions.

Nonetheless, this option is today being implemented to a limited extent, using Kurdish and Baluchi separatist organisations to attack the Iranian state in peripheral regions on the borders with Iraq and Pakistan. Since the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement of 2022, Baluchi groups have been performing an increasing number of attacks on police stations, border outposts and police vehicles in Iran, using Pakistan as a haven [33]. This has resulted in an increased security presence in the Southeast of Iran and even an altercation wherein Iran struck separatist targets inside Pakistani territory, resulting in a Pakistani response [34]. 

With regards to Kurdish groups, after increased attacks during the 2022 riots, Iran struck a deal with Baghdad that resulted in anti-Iranian Kurdish groups being moved far away from the Iranian border [35]. After the shifting balance of power in the region following Iran’s April 14th strikes on Israel, the Prime Minister of the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) travelled to Tehran and met with the Iranian Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, after which strict measures against anti-Iranian activities were implemented in the KRG’s administrative area [36]. Although these ethnic separatist insurgencies, the MeK insurgency has not been effective due to the group’s ageing cadre and inability to organise inside Iran. On the whole, these insurgents are not very effective at challenging Iranian state authority, however, they may expand their capabilities if the Iranian state were to undergo a large crisis.

Option 8: Sponsoring a Military Coup

Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Khamenei leading prayers with a group commanders of the Iranian armed forces in Tehran, on April 21, 2024 [37].

This option involves working with a group of officers in the Iranian Armed Forces to conduct a military coup d’etat and install a government more amicable to the US and its regional designs. The paper acknowledges the difficulty of such a task since both the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (IRIA) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the two branches of the Iranian Armed Forces, have strong loyalty to the state. Additionally, the state has a “pervasive intelligence and security apparatus that monitors all of its military personnel carefully for any signs of disloyalty or foreign contact that could be tip-offs of a future coup attempt”. Also, since the US has no embassy or direct presence in Iran, contact and coordination of a coup is made even more difficult. The goal of the policy would be to bring to power military men and possibly aligned politicians, who would be willing to work towards American interests.

The challenges of undertaking such a policy for US administrations are the fact that coup plotters would likely be crushed immediately as soon as their contacts with the US are exposed and that they may be counter-intelligence agents who are merely posing as coup plotters. If coup plotters are successful at seizing power, they would have to quickly purge their enemies or have cooperation among the rest of the military, the latter of which is highly unlikely in Iran. The American CIA and British MI6 previously conducted such a coup successfully in Iran in 1953 when they overthrew the government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and replaced him with a government that catered to the interests of Anglo-American oil companies [38, 39]. 

As the paper mentions, after identifying and working with agents in Iran, a similar policy as in the previous coup would have to be implemented whereby “US clandestine media could broadcast misinformation to confuse regime loyalists and try to bolster popular support for the plotters”. The US could also use electronic warfare to disrupt the government’s communications. Lastly, it would likely have to use its armed forces to intervene and help the coup plotters “because Iranian security is so formidable”, but this would risk the government finding out about the coup and would also label the plotters as foreign agents.

Besides all of this, the most basic requirement for such a coup is a very high level of intelligence regarding Iran’s military and security apparatus, which the paper self-admittingly states that the US does not have. The large-scale purges of the military that took place following the revolution, the ideological loyalty of officers, strong surveillance apparatuses and a lack of direct American presence make this a nearly impossible task. It is for these reasons that since the writing of the paper, no coup has been attempted. Although many of Iran’s diaspora are convinced that the IRIA can be used against the state and the IRGC, the paper acknowledges that this is not true and therefore, does not recommend the coup option as a strong one for US administrations seeking to overthrow the Iranian state.

Option 9: Containment

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud in Beijing on April 6, 2023 [40].

The last option that the paper proposes is Containment. This option would mean that the United States would not attempt to conduct regime change or military operations against the Islamic Republic and would also not attempt to diplomatically defang the Iranian state and gain concessions from it. The policy is viewed as one of the worst options by the authors, however, it is suggested that it could succeed similar to how the US successfully managed to contain Krushchev’s USSR, Fidel Castro’s Cuba and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The goal of this strategy would be “to prevent Tehran from harming American interests in the Middle East and Central Asia, preferably while minimizing the costs to the United States”. It would attempt to limit Iran’s support for its regional allies, its subversion of American-aligned governments and its spread of regional influence. It would also aim to prevent Iran from using WMDs and from developing allies around the world while aiming to keep Iran as economically weak as possible. The main worry with this policy is that it would allow Iran to become nuclear capable or even build nuclear weapons, which the authors see as a major catastrophe, however, they suggest that such a scenario could eventually be handled.

The paper proposes a five-pronged strategy to implement this policy. First, military, the US would attempt to stop the Iranian military from exerting influence outside of Iran and would have to be ready to retaliate against it at any moment if it chose to do so. Secondly, strategically, once Iran develops nuclear capabilities the US would have to prevent Iran from using nuclear weapons or taking aggressive actions that would threaten US vital interests. Thirdly, economically, the US would seek to keep Iran as weak as possible through the use of a sanctions regime. Fourthly, the US would have to establish a diplomatic blockade of Iran, especially in the region, and work with a confederation of states to prevent the growth of Iran’s influence. Lastly, the US would have to organise and coordinate a large-scale effort to combat Iran’s regional allies and also prevent the expansion of their influence.

The first requirement of this policy is listed as sanctions. The “crippling sanctions” that the paper proposes would target a series of economic sectors. These include a ban on military sales to Iran, a ban on high-technology sales, restrictions on trade and investment, restrictions on the travel of Iranian personnel abroad, constraints on Iranian airlines, restrictions on the transfer of hard currency and restrictions on the sale of Iranian oil and natural gas. These policies would aim to “diminish the amount of revenue the Iranian state derives from them” and “exacerbate the country’s economic problems and thereby stoke domestic dissent at home”.

In addition, the paper lists other requirements such as a conventional military presence in the region. It states that the US would require a “relatively small naval presence in the Persian Gulf - one carrier, a half-dozen surface combatants, a couple of submarines, and some minesweepers and other specialized craft - coupled with about a wing of strike and support aircraft”. However, given Iranian military advancements and global developments, this state requirement is likely out of date. Militarily, the paper also suggests that the US keep 30-60 thousand troops in Afghanistan, along with some personnel in Iraq. However, given the 2021 US exit from Afghanistan, this requirement can no longer be met [41]. The only major point of weakness that the paper saw back when it was written was a lack of US military presence in the South Caucasus and ex-Soviet Central Asia. For this, it suggested that the US reestablish bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Republic of Azerbaijan.

American soldiers and locals leaving Afghanistan during the US exit of the country in September 2021 [42].

Furthermore, the paper states that red lines would need to be established and this would have to be communicated to Iran. If Iran were to cross the lines, the US would have to be prepared to take military action. For communication, it was suggested that new diplomatic channels be established with Iranian diplomats to ensure that there is no miscommunication or misinterpretation of American actions. It also suggests that the US extend its nuclear umbrella to GCC states, including Saudi Arabia, and also to Israel to give those countries peace of mind regarding Iran and to prevent regional nuclear proliferation. In addition, it is suggested that defence pacts be made that would require the US to come to the defence of those nations. Also, the US would have to work hard to prevent the function of Iran’s regional allies such as Hezbollah. Lastly, the authors highlight that such a policy would likely alienate the American political establishment and result in severe backlash for the administration that chooses it, and therefore, that administration must be prepared to deal with such criticism.

Over the years, every US administration has adopted the containment option to some degree in tandem with other policies. Following the failure to establish a stable military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, American administrations have been forced to abandon plans to use military action against Iran as it is deemed far too costly. This policy has seen varying levels of success depending on the field it has targeted. Concerning the economy and sanctions, the policy has been very successful at exacerbating economic issues in Iran, especially due to its combination with the Persuasion option that got major concessions out of Iran before placing even harsher sanctions that dropped Iran’s exports to nearly zero in the late 2010s [43, 44]. Currently, the main strategy of the Biden administration is Containment as they seek to limit Iran’s influence and growth, while at the same time shifting out focus of West Asia to confront Russia and most importantly, China, in other regions [45].

The basic requirements for this policy as listed above can no longer be met, however. Regional countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are expanding relations with Iran and Iran is coming out of both regional and global isolation [46, 47, 48]. Additionally, Iran is now purchasing weaponry from allied states such as Russia and has itself become a major producer and exporter of weapons [49, 50]. Iranian oil is being sold at nearly pre-sanctions levels, primarily to China [51]. The US is decreasing its military presence in the region as well, which is giving Iran increased influence [52]. The Containment option seems to have reached its limits as US global influence wanes. Nonetheless, it remains the primary option that the US can use while also targeting China, Russia and other states not aligned with its global vision. Therefore, for the time being, it can be expected that the US will continue to adopt this strategy, albeit with reduced effectiveness.

Conclusion

Donald Trump and Joe Biden during the June 27, 2024, presidential debate [53].

Overall, it should be expected that any US administration will use several of these options at the same time and in combination. The Obama administration for instance, which was the first administration to have access to this paper, chose the Persuasion option in combination with both the Colour Revolution option and the Containment option. First, they helped back the 2009 Green Movement to possibly create a new political arrangement in Iran [54]. After this failed, they applied ‘crippling sanctions’ and began negotiations to weaken the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for sanctions being lifted [55, 56].

Although US aims were achieved and Iran’s only heavy-water reactor was destroyed as a part of the agreement, most sanctions remained and no serious foreign investment took place in Iran from the US and its allies [22, 6]. Following this, Containment was implemented until the Trump administration took over. 

Donald Trump made a radical change in his Iran policies, abandoning altogether the Persuasion option and adopting a combination of the Colour Revolution, Insurgency, Airstrikes and Containment options. By exploiting social movements within Iran, the Trump administration strongly pursued a regime change through colour revolutions, further exacerbating the social discontent in Iran through the use of the ‘maximum pressure’ policies and increased sanctions [8, 57]. At the same time, increased backing was given to the MeK to build the groundwork for an insurgency that could be combined with a colour revolution [58]. Although airstrikes on Iranian soil never took place, the Trump administration did assassinate Iran’s highest-ranking general, Qasem Soleimani, in an airstrike in Baghdad [59]. This weakened Iran’s regional position but also resulted in an Iranian retaliatory attack on the US Ain al-Assad base in Iraq, resulting in the United States backing off from any further confrontations [60]. In the last days of the Trump administration, Containment was chosen as a policy as both countries had gone to the brink of war but refused to enter it.

Under the Biden administration, much of the same policies as the Trump administration have continued. Although many expected Biden to revive the Persuasion option, this did not occur. President Biden instead chose to back a colour revolution attempt, combined with ethnic insurgency movements, during the 2021-22 ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ Movement [61]. Although no confrontations took place, Israel activated the Israeli Airstrikes option in a limited format by striking the Iranian Embassy compound in Damascus [62]. This resulted in Iranian retaliation through Operation True Promise, effectively putting an end to the further use of this option, as Israel was made to realise its weakened military position vis-a-vis Iran [63]. At the same time as all of this, Containment was also attempted, however, this policy also suffered a major blow as Iran and Saudi Arabia normalised relations in March 2022 [46].

How US-Iran relations will proceed in the future and which options the new US administration that wins power in 2024 will use is an open question. What is certain is that as of now certain options have been neutralised. The option for a military coup was always highly unrealistic and therefore, never implemented. The Engagement option was also never chosen due to the high risks it presents for the US. The options of military invasion and US or Israeli airstrikes can also be added to this list of defunct options. Due to the expansion of Iranian military power and technical capabilities in the last 15 years, an invasion or airstrikes would now be met with strong responses from Iran and would therefore not be prudent to use. This is unless the Persuasion option is used to get Iran to give up its regional allies and drone & missile programs. The possibility of this occurring has increased with the election of Masoud Pezeshkian as Iranian President and the return of the Reformist-Moderate movement to power in Iran. However, whether the Persuasion option will be used, as well as the Iranian state’s willingness to succumb to it, is as of yet unclear.

The Containment option remains a strong choice that all US administrations will be forced to apply. This is especially because the NATO-Russia confrontation in Ukraine and the expanding US-China rivalry mean that the United States now expends more of its resources outside of West Asia to combat its near-peer rivals, China and Russia. Regardless, we can expect that the Colour Revolution and Insurgency options will continue to be used as the social tensions increase in Iran, with sanctions playing an important role in this. These tensions provide fertile ground for the implementation of these options, which can only be neutralised if the Iranian state makes serious efforts to resolve the economic issues faced by lower-class Iranians and socially divisive issues such as women’s rights.

While the election of Masoud Pezeshkian has changed the dynamics of US-Iranian relations, the results of the U.S. presidential elections are still unknown. What is known is that the confrontation between the United States and Iran will continue until either the Iranian state faces regime change, collapses, or undergoes radical changes in its foreign, regional and military policies. Until that point, which may or may not come, we can expect constant debate and analysis of these options in American, Iranian and international media, just as we have seen over the last 15 years.

Bibliography

1. Brookings Institution Press, Which Path to Persia?: Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran (Washington, D.C, 2009)

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Comprehensive_Plan_of_Action

3. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal

4. https://www.fardayeeghtesad.com/news/8298

5. https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1813169/

6. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/16/west-failing-deliver-nuclear-deal-promises-iran-vice-president-ali-akbar-salehi

7. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html

8. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/failure-us-maximum-pressure-against-iran

9. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-parliament-passes-bill-to-increase-nuke-activities/2061718

10. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/26/bidens-iran-policy-nuclear-deal-jcpoa/

11. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2024/jul/08/pezeshkian-issues

12. https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/Can-Irans-New-President-Revive-The-Nuclear-Deal-With-Washington.html

13. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/25/javad-zarif-negotiator-of-iran-nuclear-deal-backs-reformist-presidential-candidate

14. https://www.irna.ir/news/85520598

15. https://aftabnews.ir/fa/news/917904

16. https://ecoiran.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%BE%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-108/67357-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1-%DA%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%BA-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%DA%86%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%AF

17. https://english.aawsat.com/world/5037791-what-changes-are-expected-under-irans-new-president

18. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/jul/8/masoud-pezeshkians-win-wont-change-us-approach-ira/

19. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Meeting_with_the_Shah_of_Iran._Mohammad_Reza_Shah_Pahlavi,_President_Kennedy,_Secretary_of_Defense_Robert_McNamara...._-_NARA_-_194206.jpg

20. https://www.army.mil/article/267633/40th_infantry_division_soldiers_mobilize_to_middle_east

21. https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/03/07/us-b-52s-again-fly-over-mideast-in-warning-to-iran/?contentFeatureId=f0fmoahPVC2AbfL-2-1-8&contentQuery=%7B%22includeSections%22%3A%22%2Fhome%22%2C%22excludeSections%22%3A%22%22%2C%22feedSize%22%3A10%2C%22feedOffset%22%3A1285%7D

22. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35285095

23. https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/

24. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/12/13/us-quickly-updated-israeli-f-35s-after-hamas-attack-officials-say/

25. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-accuses-un-nuclear-watchdog-capitulating-iran-2023-06-04/

26. https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/analysis/operation-true-promise

27. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68854498

28. https://www.cfr.org/project/us-pivot-asia-and-american-grand-strategy

29. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/12/middleeast/iran-protests-death-toll-intl-hnk/index.html

30. https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/green-movement

31. https://meimages.com/stories/pdki/

32. https://theintercept.com/2023/02/11/iran-protests-mek-congress-maryam-rajavi/

33. https://www.eurasiareview.com/22042024-evolving-unrest-sistan-balochistan-hotbed-for-insurgency-analysis/

34. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68014882

35. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/28/iran-says-deal-agreed-with-iraq-for-disarming-relocation-of-kurdish-rebels

36. https://presidency.gov.krd/en/president-nechirvan-barzani-in-tehran-meets-with-irans-supreme-leader-grand-ayatollah-sayyid-ali-khamenei/

37. https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-khamenei-tells-troops-to-learn-enemys-tactics-after-tit-for-tat-attacks/

38. https://apnews.com/article/iran-1953-coup-cia-218323db3cc1aca6bde1e54827527e8d

39. https://www.declassifieduk.org/iran-1953-mi6-plots-with-islamists-to-overthrow-democracy/

40. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/04/iran-saudi-arabia-fms-meet-china-agree-expand-ties

41. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/30/politics/us-military-withdraws-afghanistan/index.html

42. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-the-tragic-afghanistan-withdrawal-should-reassure-us-allies-in-asia/

43. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/international-sanctions-iran

44. https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/IRN/iran/exports

45. https://www.ft.com/content/be2c3d04-41b2-417f-9314-f4bfb9758665

46. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/china-brokered-saudi-iran-deal-driving-wave-of-reconciliation-says-wang

47. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-top-security-official-uae-seek-stronger-ties-2023-03-16/

48. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/495228/Iran-joining-SCO-BRICS-to-bring-achievements-in-foreign-investment

49. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/19/iran-russia-arms-weapons-defense-exports-ukraine-war-middle-east/

50. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-drone-uavs-russia/

51. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/irans-expanding-oil-trade-with-top-buyer-china-2023-11-10/

52. https://global.upenn.edu/perryworldhouse/news/one-step-forward-two-steps-behind-us-shift-away-middle-east]

53. https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/tv/tv-news/biden-trump-first-2024-debate-tv-ratings-1235934892/

54. https://www.foreignassistance.gov/cd/iran/2009/disbursements/2

55. https://www.nbcnews.com/video/obama-us-enacted-crippling-sanctions-on-iran-44431939809

56. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal

57. https://www.voanews.com/a/trump-vows-new-support-for-iranian-people-/4190464.html

58. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/nov/09/mek-iran-revolution-regime-trump-rajavi

59. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/02/middleeast/baghdad-airport-rockets/index.html

60. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iranian-attack-al-asad-air-base-60-minutes-2021-08-08/

61. https://bit.ly/rtsgsubstack

62. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/2/attack-on-iran-consulate-in-damascus-what-do-we-know

63. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/14/true-promise-why-and-how-did-iran-launch-a-historic-attack-on-israel

64. https://www.msnbc.com/transcripts/the-last-word/2020-01-08-msna1320536

    
    

Republished from RTSG, with thanks!